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(A Critical Overview of the Constant Revival) 
 
Helena Rosenblatt 
Hunter College and the Graduate Center 
City University of New York 
 
Recent years have seen a remarkable renewal of interest in the thought of 
Benjamin Constant (1767-1830).  For long recognized mainly as the author of the literary 
masterpiece Adolphe, it is now Constant’s political writings that are increasingly the 
focus of attention. Paperback editions of his major works are presently available in both 
French and English, helping to establish his growing reputation as a founding father of 
modern liberalism. As a seminal liberal thinker, it is certain that Constant’s stature has 
benefited from the recent climate of opinion in the western world and, in particular, from 
the return to fashion of liberalism as a social and political doctrine. Paradoxically, 
however, this political climate has also led to some problems, since presentist concerns 
have left an undeniable imprint on the image we have of Constant. 
Philosophers and political theorists, rather than historians, have dominated the 
Constant revival.  By and large, moreover, these high-profile Constant scholars have been 
a rather gloomy lot.  Disillusioned with modern politics and anxious about democracy, 
they have read Constant as a prophet of all their own doubts and fears. The Constant they 
admire is someone who criticizes, denounces and lays bare the many problems 
confronting modernity. Thus Constant has served as a useful tool to theorists and social 
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commentators with polemical and mainly contemporary purposes in mind. This is why 
Constant scholarship often seems to say more about the modern scholars who study him 
than it does about Constant.  
Like all great thinkers, Constant spoke in terms that would transcend his 
immediate historical context. Deeply convinced that he was living on the threshold of a 
new age, he deliberately addressed himself to the “modern” men and “friends of liberty” 
he hoped to sway, often using very general, even universalizing, language. Blessed not 
only with a keen eye for detail, but an uncommon capacity for analytical thinking, he 
consistently sought to identify and articulate the “big picture,” or what he thought were 
the broader sociological and political patterns in history. In so doing, he became one of 
the first to advocate many of the liberal values we still cherish today, from “small 
government” to individual rights and liberties. 
All of this, along with his obvious literary talents, help to explain why Constant’s 
writings seem so accessible to us today. He strikes a chord with modern readers, who 
often marvel at his uncanny ability to speak directly to them.   It is said, for example,  that 
Constant’s world is one that is very “familiar” to us.1 So “close” is Constant’s thought 
that sometimes we even have trouble “seeing” it.2  Interestingly, it is when Constant is 
being critical and diagnostic that his writings seem to have the greatest resonance.  For 
example, what Plamenatz admired most about Constant was the way he identified things 
that “moved him to fear or disgust.” Moreover, Constant described these fearful things in 
a way that was “larger than life,” which is why he was able to speak to us across the 
                                                 
1 John Plamenatz, “Introduction” in Readings from Liberal Writers, New York, Barnes & Noble, 
1965, p. 30. 
2 Tzvetan Todorov, A Passion for Democracy. The Life, the Women He Loved and the Thought of 
Benjamin Constant, New York: Algora Publishing, 1999, p. 6 . 
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centuries. Thus, to Plamenatz, as to many others like him, Constant’s value lies not so 
much in what he has to say about his own times, but in the way “he seems to prophesy 
rather than describe.” When reading Constant, “we think of our own times rather than 
his.” To Plamenatz, it often sounded as if Constant were speaking of Hitler’s Germany.3  
Undoubtedly, it is anti-totalitarianism that has been the most powerful magnet 
drawing political theorists to Constant. Isaiah Berlin is just one among a prominent and 
growing group of liberals who worry about the “excesses of democratic politics” and the 
totalitarian potential lurking within.  In his famous essay “Two Concepts of Liberty,”4 
Berlin warned that the connection between democracy and individual liberty was more 
tenuous than many of his contemporaries believed. He showcased Constant as one of the 
first thinkers to realize this and who therefore wisely endorsed a “negative,” rather than 
“positive” conception of freedom.  In contrast to theorists like Rousseau, to whom 
freedom meant the possession of a share in the public power, Constant viewed freedom 
as “non-interference” or lack of coercion. Having witnessed the French Revolution, and 
the infernal dynamics that led to the Terror, Constant understood that liberty in the 
Rousseauean, “positive” sense could easily end up destroying many of the “negative” 
liberties that both he and Berlin held sacred.  
Berlin’s interpretation of Rousseau was strongly influenced by the theories of 
Jacob Talmon.5 Both Talmon and Berlin understood Rousseau’s theory of democracy to 
be proto-totalitarian.  In contrast, Constant knew that one should not automatically equate 
liberty with democratic participation.  Through his own life experiences he had imbibed 
                                                 
3 J. Plamenatz, Readings, p. 30. 
4 Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. 
5 See in particular Jacob Talmon, The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy, New York: Praeger, 
1960. 
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the important lesson that “democracy can still crush individuals as mercilessly as any 
previous ruler.”6 Crucially, Constant realized that freedom meant drawing a frontier 
between the area of a person’s private life and that of public authority.  This is what made 
him a much- admired founder of modern liberalism and, indeed, “the most eloquent of all 
defenders of freedom and privacy.”7 
Berlin’s essay obviously had a polemical purpose. He himself admitted that his 
emphasis on negative liberty was due to his fear of twentieth century dictatorships, in 
Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union, and elsewhere in the world. By the time he wrote his 
essay, the main danger was undoubtedly Soviet-style communism; and his goal in writing 
it was to defend a liberal conception of freedom against contemporary communist 
thought.  With this aim in mind, Berlin focused on those aspects of Constant’s argument 
that could shore up his own. He used Constant to warn of the tendencies modern 
democratic movements have to become totalitarian. 
Discerning readers have noted that Berlin’s essay “updates,” 8 rather than 
elucidates, Constant’s argument. For it is an obvious fact that Constant knew nothing of 
Nazism or Stalinism when he wrote his famous essay on the liberty of the moderns, so 
admired by Berlin. Constant of course had Napoleon in mind and not Hitler, Stalin or 
Marxism. Indeed, treatments of Constant more attentive to his historical context and 
intended message have shown that he wrote this piece not to denounce positive liberty 
and political participation,  but to warn against their decline. 9  They point, in particular, 
to the end of the essay, where Constant alerts his contemporaries to the tendency modern 
                                                 
6 I. Berlin, Four Essays, pp. 163-4. 
7 Ibid., p. 126. 
8 Claude Galipeau, Isaiah Berlin’s Liberalism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994, pp. 10 & 140? 
9 James Mitchell Lee,  “Doux Commerce, Social Organization, and Modern Liberty in the 
Thought of Benjamin Constant,” Annales Benjamin Constant 25, 2002. 
 5 
men have “to surrender too easily” their right of participating in political power. In this 
part of the essay, Constant speaks glowingly of liberty in the positive sense as “the most 
powerful, the most effective means of self-development that heaven has given us.” 10 
Furthermore, readers interested in uncovering Constant’s intended meaning have 
shown that his lifelong aim was not so much to distinguish positive from negative liberty, 
but to find ways of reconciling and sustaining them both. Counter-posing Rousseau to 
Constant is therefore an exercise of dubious value for understanding the latter’s thought. 
Several scholars have noted how indebted to Rousseau Constant actually was and have 
determined that his purpose was never to reject Rousseau, but rather to harmonize his 
thought with that of Montesquieu. 11 But Berlin’s purposes led him to ignore such 
inconvenient aspects of Constant’s thought.  Anticipating a scholarly trend, Berlin also 
emphasized Constant’s oppositional and critical side while downplaying his more 
positive contributions to political and social theory, such as his constitutional  thought 
and his lifelong work on religion. Had Berlin acknowledged these more constructive 
aspects of Constant’s oeuvre, he might have uncovered a more optimistic Constant, a 
man who believed in progress and human “perfectibility,” and who valued both self-
                                                 
10 Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns,” in 
Political Writings, p. 327. This does not prevent some fans of republicanism from continuing to 
caricature Constant’s liberalism as the epitome of  the “negative,” laissez-faire type. See, for 
example, Alain Boyer, “De l’actualité des Anciens Républicains,” in Libéralisme et 
républicanisme, Caen: Presses Universitaires de Caen, 2000, pp. 37-38; Philip Pettit, 
Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 
pp. 17-18; Quentin Skinner, Liberty before Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998, pp. 60 & 117, and Richard Whatmore, Republicanism and the French Revolution: An 
Intellectual History of Jean-Baptiste Say’s Political Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000, pp. xiii, 5, 199. 
11 For example, Guy Dodge,  Benjamin Constant’s Philosophy of Liberalism. A Study in Politics 
and Religion, Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980 and, more recently, T. 
Todorov, A  Passion for Democracy. 
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abnegation  and sacrifice as forces for good in the world.12  But this side of Constant was 
quite irrelevant to Berlin’s purposes; moreover, it would probably have displeased him, 
since Berlin abhorred perfectibilism13 and subscribed to a type of liberalism that has been 
described as “agonistic” and anti-teleological. 14  
The liberal and anti-totalitarian turn came later to France, but when it did, it also 
led to a renewal of interest in the political writings of Benjamin Constant. Recent studies 
have described “the intellectual sea change”15 that occurred within the French academic 
community in the 1970s as intellectuals there abandoned the reigning Marxist paradigm 
and came to view both communism and revolution as totalitarian.  Central to this 
dramatic shift in French intellectual politics was François Furet’s Penser la Revolution 
française, which both drew from, and contributed to, the prevailing anti-totalitarian 
mood. 16 Denouncing interpretations of the Revolution that he believed were more 
commemorative than they were analytical,  Furet highlighted the Revolution’s negative, 
even pathological, aspects.  Deliberately turning away from traditional social history and 
the question of social causes, he wished to restore to the Revolution what he thought was 
its  “most obvious dimension, the political one.”17 Thus he focused attention on 
revolutionary ideology, which he argued was key to understanding the Revolution’s 
                                                 
12 Helena Rosenblatt, “Commerce et religion dans le libéralisme de Benjamin Constant,” 
Commentaire 102 (Summer 2003),  pp. 415-426. 
13 C. Galipeau, Berlin’s Liberalism, pp. 81 & 144. 
14 John Gray, Isaiah Berlin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1997 
15 Mark Lilla, “The Other Velvet Revolution: Continental Liberalism and its Discontents,” 
Daedalus (Spring, 1994) p. 148. 
16 Michael Scott Christofferson, “An Antitotalitarian History of the French Revolution: François 
Furet’s Penser la Revolution française in the Intellectual Politics of the Late 1970s, French 
Historical Studies 22, 4 (fall 1999),  557-611. See also Sunil Khilnani, The Intellectual Left in 
Postwar France,  New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1993 
17 François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution, trans. E. Forster, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981, p. 27. On the larger context of this interest in ‘the political’, see Jeremy 
Jennings, “The Return of the Political? New French Journals in the History of Political Thought,” 
History of Political Thought xviii, 1 (Spring 1997) pp. 148-156 
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tragic derailment from 1789 to 1794. He determined that this ideology was fundamentally 
flawed—in its views on democracy and equality, and, most importantly, in its belief in 
“the illusion of politics”18—the poisonous idea that every problem has a political 
solution.  It was this defective ideology that caused the Terror and, perhaps even more 
ominously, made the French Revolution a founding moment of a proto-totalitarian French 
political culture. 
In his effort to reconceptualize the Revolution, Furet turned to nineteenth century 
historiography  and to the many insights offered by nineteenth century liberals, who had 
for long been ignored, if not disdained, by Marxists.  In particular, Furet appreciated 
Constant as one of the first to understand the pathology of the Revolution and its proto-
totalitarian nature.  In Furet’s words, Constant’s “entire political thought” revolved 
around this question,  namely the problem of explaining the Terror.19 Following Furet, 
other French scholars have taken a renewed interest in Constant, admiring him mainly as 
an historian, interpreter and, perhaps above all, a critic of the Revolution. Constant is 
appreciated as someone who, like Furet himself, understood the revolutionaries’ 
disastrous overinvestment in the political.   
It has been noted that Furet’s version of the French Revolution reflected his desire 
to forge a “useable history,”20 one that could explain both his own intellectual trajectory 
and France’s recent illiberal past. To Furet, studying revolutionary culture became an 
                                                 
18 F. Furet, Interpreting, p. 26. 
19 François Furet, “La Révolution sans la Terreur? Le débat des historiens du XIXe siècle, Le 
Débat13 (June 1981), p. 41. 
20 Steven Kaplan, Farewell Revolution. The Historian’s Feud: France, 1789/1989, Ithaca and 
New York: Cornell University Press, 1995. 
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opportunity to ponder  “the ambiguity of modern democracy,”21  and a way of 
understanding the democratic “malaise” of contemporary French political culture.  In 
fact, upon careful reading, one can see that Furet’s interpretation of the Revolution 
reflected not only his own fears about totalitarianism,  but  even an ambivalence about the 
democratic project itself. It has been noted that Furet’s work, like that of several of his 
disciples and colleagues,  is permeated by a kind of “pathological vision of democracy” 
which often seems to suggest that the aim of modern politics should be to contain rather 
than advance democracy.22  
To begin, one would have to say that it is rather odd for Constant to be admired 
by people who dislike the Revolution so intensely, since Constant dedicated his life to 
both defending its achievements and promoting its fundamental aims.  The truth is that 
for most of his life, Constant worried much more about reaction, or a return to the past, 
than he did about the future. Moreover, and in contrast to many of his recent French 
admirers, Constant’s thought was certainly more concerned with advancing democracy 
than it was with containing it. There is, in fact, little ambivalence about democracy in 
Constant. He admired Rousseau, was a consistent advocate of  popular sovereignty, and 
looked very favorably upon what he hailed as the  “march of equality” throughout 
history. Constant did not worry so much about the so-called “excesses” of democracy as 
he did about political hypocrisy—the abuse of words and concepts by despots with the 
aim of masking self-serving and oppressive regimes.  Having observed Napoleon first 
                                                 
21 François Furet, “Revolutionary Government,” in A Critical Dictionary of the French 
Revolution, eds. Mona Ozouf and François Furet, trans. Arthur Goldhammer, Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press, 1989, p  558.  
22 Andrew Jainchill and Samuel Moyn, “French Democracy between Totalitarianism and 
Solidarity: Pierre Rosanvallon and Revisionist Historiography,” Journal of Modern History, 76, 
1, 2004. 
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hand, Constant was concerned not principally about the power of the people, but of those 
who claimed to be acting in the name of the people.  Finally, it is ironic that those who, 
like Furet, admire Constant also dislike social history so much. As Larry Siedentop 
argued some time ago, one of the great innovations of French liberals like Constant was 
their sociological approach to both history and political theory.  It was they who first 
emphasized socio-economic change and invented the concept of a social revolution. 23 To 
enlist Constant in an effort to attack the Revolution, question the viability of democracy, 
and dismantle social history, hardly makes any sense at all.  
Nevertheless, it is anxiety about modernity, democracy and totalitarianism that 
fuels Marcel Gauchet’s interest in Constant, first expressed in a remarkable essay 
published in 1980. Gauchet has since revealed that his ideas on the Revolution were 
formed in a generally “pessimistic atmosphere.” In his recent autobiographical 
reflections, he explains that his first readings on the subject were inspired by the same 
question that animated  François Furet, namely that of the relationship between 
democracy and Terror. Gauchet recalls that he learned a good deal about this from Jacob 
Talmon, whose views on Rousseau,  Jacobinism and “totalitarian democracy” had a great 
“subterranean influence” in France.  Like Furet, Gauchet thought that studying the 
Revolution was crucial since it called attention to  “the ambivalent nature of democratic 
principles” and, more specifically, to “the peril of tyranny potentially inscribed in popular 
sovereignty.”24 Hence the importance of Constant. Gauchet hails him as “one of the most 
                                                 
23 Larry Siedentop, “Two Liberal Traditions,” The Idea of Freedom. Essays in Honour of Isaiah 
Berlin. Alan Ryan, ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979,  pp. 153-174. 
24 Marcel Gauchet,  Condition historique. Entretiens avec François Azouvi et Sylvain Piron, 
Paris: Stock, 2003, pp. 26 & 264. 
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important and penetrating interpreters of the legacy of the Revolution.”25 Not 
surprisingly, this legacy is described by Gauchet in predominantly negative terms. He 
praises Constant for having understood the Revolution’s various failures, problems and 
even “evil”.26 And much like Furet, Gauchet claims that the “tyrannical derailment of the 
Revolution” constitutes “the center” of Constant’s thought.27 
Explaining his own approach to history and political theory, Gauchet  recounts 
that he “explicitly tries to relate an interrogation of the past with the problems of the 
present.”28 He describes his intellectual project as essentially “philosophical”:  His goal is 
to understand the present, and he does so by making a “detour through history.”29 
Studying the thought of liberals like Benjamin Constant is important to him because of 
how very relevant it remains. Gauchet believes that “we find ourselves in a position 
hardly different”30 and that “Constant’s diagnosis is remarkable for its continuing 
validity.”31 Constant helps us to understand the various “totalitarian derailments” that 
followed the French Revolution. But more than that, he enlightens us as to the 
“devastating contradictions of modernity ”32 and “the democratic problem [le mal 
démocratique]”33 itself. Constant’s “remarkable prescience” made him uniquely able to 
                                                 
25 Marcel Gauchet, “Constant,” in Dictionnaire critique de la Révolution française, eds. François 
Furet and Mona Ozouf, Paris: Flammarion, 1988, p. 951. 
26 Ibid, p. 959 
27 Marcel Gauchet, “Benjamin Constant: l’illusion lucide du libéralisme,” in Benjamin Constant, 
Ecrits politiques, ed. Marcel Gauchet, Paris: Gallimard, 1997, p. 28 
28 M. Gauchet, Condition historique, p. 8. 
29 Ibid., p. 10 
30 M. Gauchet, “Illusion,” p. 27 and, similarly, Condition, p. 266. 
31 Ibid., pp. 54; 62 
32 Ibid., p. 28 
33 Ibid., p. 45.  
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“anticipate intellectually”34 the difficulties modern men face. This is why he can serve as 
an “one of the best guides”35 to our own self-understanding. 
Constant seems to have appealed to Gauchet in an almost touchingly personal 
way. To him, Constant is someone who not only saw the dangers of totalitarianism but 
who, like Gauchet himself, felt a profound revulsion for the power of the state.  
Gauchet’s anti-totalitarianism is nurtured by an underlying anti-statism, a residue of 
youthful anarchist sympathies, and a likely result of his early engrossment in the thought 
of anthropologist Pierre Clastres.36 These personal preoccupations help to explain why 
Gauchet seems at times to present Constant’s liberalism as a reworking and refinement of 
essentially pro-anarchist sentiments.  Indeed, it appears that Gauchet not only projects his 
own worries and tastes onto Constant, but even ascribes to Constant his own intellectual 
trajectory, at one point speculating, for example, that one of Constant’s “authors of 
reference” on his way to becoming a liberal was Thomas Paine.37 
But viewing Constant through an anarchist lens is just as historically incorrect as 
using an anti-totalitarian one. Etienne Hofmann’s important work on Constant’s early 
political manuscripts presents a much more accurate picture of his early intellectual 
development and preoccupations.   It convincingly shows that Constant’s route to 
liberalism had little if anything to do with anarchism. Constant came to liberalism not 
                                                 
34 Ibid., p. 26 
35 Ibid 
36 For Gauchet’s  juvenile anarchism and interest in Clastres, I am indebted to Samuel Moyn, who 
generously shared with me his article  “Savage and Modern Liberty: Marcel Gauchet and the 
Origins of New French Thought,”  prior to its completion and publication.   On Clastres,  see also 
Samuel Moyn,  “Of Savagery and Civil Society: Pierre Clastres and the Transformation of French 
Political Thought,” Modern Intellectual History 1. 
37 M. Gauchet, “Illusion,” p. 60. That Gauchet came to liberalism from a prior infatuation with 
anarchism is the argument of Samuel Moyn. 
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from a youthful anarchist sentiments,38 but from an early sympathy for both democracy 
and republicanism. 39 Once again, Gauchet’s picture of Constant says more about the 
anti-statist and anti-totalitarian concerns of a certain group of French intellectuals than it 
does about Constant. 
Stephen Holmes’ work on Constant reflects another intellectual environment 
entirely. As a politically engaged American scholar living in the United States, Holmes’ 
concern is quite obviously not with totalitarianism. Nor is he particularly worried about 
Marxism. He has no sympathy at all for anarchism and, interestingly enough, does not 
even try to engage the work of French interpreters like Marcel Gauchet.  Rather, Holmes’ 
intellectual project is to defend his own version of democratic, strong-state liberalism 
against its non-Marxist American critics.40 He criticizes his opposition for being bad 
historians and for misrepresenting liberalism.  It is in an effort to set the record straight 
that he revives the thought of Benjamin Constant. 
According to Holmes, it is quite wrong to assume a fundamental contradiction 
between democratic and liberal values. It is also misleading to depict liberalism as 
essentially antistatist.  In Holmes’ depiction, Constant emerges as an advocate of 
efficacious government at the service of liberal and democratic values. For example, 
                                                 
38 It is true that Constant read Godwin carefully and even went to the trouble of translating him; 
but Constant’s precise intentions in doing so are far from clear, as are the reasons for his 
abandonment of the project. But it is likely that Constant’s interest in Godwin had more to do 
with his optimism about human perfectibility than it did with pessimism about the state. 
39 Etienne Hofmann,  Les “Principes de politique” de Benjamin Constant. La Genèse d’une 
oeuvre et l’évolution de la pensée de leur auteur (1789-1806), vol 1, Geneva: Droz, 1980. On 
Constant’s early life and intellectual development reliable sources are also Kurt Kloocke,  
Benjamin Constant. Une biographie intellectuelle, Geneva: Droz, 1984  and K. Steven Vincent,  
“Benjamin Constant, the French Revolution, and the Origins of French Romantic Liberalism,” 
French Historical Studies, 23, 4 (fall, 2000). 
40 Holmes’ political commitments are most evident in his The Anatomy of Antiliberalism, 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1993, but see also his Passions and Constraint: On 
the Theory of Liberal Democracy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995. 
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Holmes is anxious to argue that Constant was never hostile to the concept of sovereignty 
itself. In fact, he locates Constant in the tradition of French politique reformers, going so 
far as to argue that in some ways, Constant was “closer to Voltaire and Turgot”41 than he 
was to Montesquieu. Moreover, Holmes insists that Constant was never against 
democracy so much as he was against democratic “pretexts”, “deceitful rhetoric” and 
“communitarian cant.”42  Here Holmes’ own distaste for modern American 
communitarians surfaces. Elsewhere Holmes admits that his book’s aim is quite 
“philosophical.”43 He believes that reading Constant is useful because  “[t]aken seriously, 
Constant’s insights suggest a major reassessment of the categories that still dominate the 
debate about liberalism.”44 It is the contemporary debate about liberalism that interests 
Holmes the most. 
This is also what leads Holmes to make some misstatements of his own about 
Constant’s liberalism.  An important lesson Holmes wants to impart to his readers is that 
politics should remain instrumental and not moralizing. He is committed to refuting the 
notion that a “disbelief in the objectivity of values, or in the knowability of objective 
values”45 weakens liberalism as a force for good in the world. To this end, he enlists 
Constant, describing him as a “true skeptic,”46 who lacked moral certainty and yet whose 
very skepticism nourished  “a willingess to fight”47 for liberal and egalitarian reforms. 
Once again, this argument about Constant’s supposed skepticism says more about 
                                                 
41 Stephen Holmes Benjamin Constant and the Making of Modern Liberalism, New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1984, p. 10.  
42 Ibid., p. 2. 
43Ibid., p. 1.  
44 Ibid., pp. 1-2. 
45 Ibid., p. 7. 
46 Ibid., p. 7. 
47 Ibid., p. 7. 
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Stephen Holmes’ distrust for contemporary “communitarian cant” than it does about 
Constant. It is based on a shallow reading of Constant’s religious writings48 and  a 
profound ignorance of his indebtedness to an important tradition of Protestant thought.49  
Another modern commentator who dwells on Constant’s supposed  “skepticism” 
is Biancamaria  Fontana, although her purposes for doing so are less easy to determine. 
Calling him not only “a natural sceptic,” but also “essentially pessimistic,”50 she turns 
Constant into an almost tragic prophet of doom and gloom. Fontana especially 
appreciates what Constant has to say about the “difficulties of the modern condition.” She 
likes the way he denounces “the falsity, sufferings and moral impoverishment of the 
modern age.”51 She admires him for having realized that the progress towards modern 
democracy is “a long march through a dark and insidious labyrinth,” and for knowing 
that the journey  “would prove more and more adverse as the game went on.” 52 To 
Fontana, Constant’s theories are useful because they are “capable of reminding us of our 
own unsolved problems, present failings or impending disasters.”53 They strike a chord 
with all those “who have doubts” about the capacity of political theory to cure society’s 
problems.54 
                                                 
48 Holmes gets Constant’s views on religion quite wrong. See H. Rosenblatt, “Commerce et 
religion,” p. 422. 
49 Kurt Kloocke is the expert on Constant’s connections with German Protestant thought. Start 
with “Benjamin Constant et l’Allemagne: Individualité – Religion – Politique,” Annales 
Benjamin Constant  27 (2003) pp. 127-171, which also contains references to his other writings. 
See also J. Lee, referenced in fn 59 below. 
50 B. Fontana,  op. cit., pp. xvi, xvii 
51 “Introduction,” in Benjamin Constant, Political Writings, Biancamaria Fontana transl. and ed., 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 19. 
52 B. Fontana, Post-Revolutionary, p. xiv 
53 B. Fontana, “Introduction,” p. 41. 
54 Ibid., p. 42. 
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Such an extraordinarily pessimistic reading of Constant is truly baffling. Once 
again, it can only be the result of ignoring and/or misreading large portions of Constant’s 
work, in particular, his abundant writings on religion. It seems to betray the influence of 
an earlier historiographical tradition, one that overemphasized the importance of 
Constant’s novel Adolphe and erroneously equated Constant with its fictional protagonist. 
Why such a skeptic and pessimist should dedicate himself to a life of public service is 
hard to fathom.  The point is, once again, that the real, historical Constant was not as 
gloomy and pessimistic as his many of his modern commentators seem to be.  
On the contrary, George Armstrong Kelly, an unusually perceptive reader whose 
work on Constant has been strangely neglected, noted quite some time ago that he was 
both pragmatic about politics and optimistic about the future. Moreover, in  Kelly’s 
estimation, Constant was actually “an eloquent advocate, but a poor prophet.” He was 
“wrong on a number of things” and even suffered from a “long-range blindness.”55 It  is 
worth pointing out, for example, that there is very little about poverty, class antagonism 
or social welfare in Constant’s writings. This lack of prescience is what led Kelly to the 
realization that “Constant hardly saw or projected the problems of modern liberty in 
democratic ages.”56 Adopting a more rigorously historical perspective on Constant, one 
that judged him against thinkers of his own time,  Kelly concluded that Constant was 
positively “Panglossian”57 in his views about the future.  
How might one account for this very different reading of Constant? Unlike the 
other scholars surveyed in this essay, Kelly approached Constant from a historical and 
                                                 
55 George Armstrong Kelly, “Constant Commotion: Avatars of a Pure Liberal,” Journal of 
Modern History 54, 3 (Sept 1982), p. 517. 
56 George Armstrong Kelly, The Humane Comedy: Constant, Tocqueville and French Liberalism, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 46. 
57 G. Kelly, “Constant Commotion,” p. 517. 
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comparative perspective. He avoided the question of contemporary relevance and 
restored Constant to his own political and intellectual context. Moreover, Kelly’s 
personal interest in religion and inter-disciplinary inclinations drew him to investigate the 
connections between religion and politics in Constant’s thought. Thus he could not help 
but notice Constant’s unflagging faith in progress and human “perfectibility” at a time 
when many Frenchmen were not so optimistic. Kelly determined that Constant’s real 
contribution to political theory lay not in any prophetic abilities regarding the “excesses” 
or problems of modern democracy, but rather in his innovative attempt to “spiritualiz[e] 
liberalism.”58 Kelly invited people to pay some attention to the interaction of religion and 
politics in Constant’s thought, a suggestion that has yet to be followed.59 Indeed, the 
other scholars reviewed in this essay ignored this side of Constant altogether, leaving us 
with a picture of Constant that is both dark and distorted.60 In the case of French scholars 
like Gauchet and Manent, the neglect of religion is all the more remarkable given the 
importance attributed to religion in their own theoretical writings.61 
It is a matter of some consequence that early nineteenth century France witnessed 
not a decline in religious belief, or a popular “disenchantment”, but rather a strong 
                                                 
58 G. Kelly, “Constant Commotion,” p. 516. 
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religious revival. Constant was, of course, not the only liberal of his time to notice this. In 
fact, the relationship between religion and politics became a pressing issue to theorists 
across the political spectrum. People as divergent in outlook as Lamennais, Cousin and 
Constant agreed in the importance of religion to society. Reacting to the devastation 
suffered by the Church during the Revolution, and profoundly troubled by the egoism, 
materialism and social fragmentation they observed all around them, many Frenchmen on 
the left worried that their country was in the midst of a spiritual crisis needing immediate 
attention. Some placed their hopes in a “new Christianity” that would morally regenerate, 
unite and stabilize France.62 Constant, however, went further than most in believing not 
only that a free society needed religion to survive, but that religion itself,  if it was to play 
its positive and designated role in history, needed freedom as well. To his mind, liberty 
and religion reinforced each other and together fostered the moral improvement of 
individuals. The key to the spiritual and moral “crisis” France was facing was more, not 
less, freedom. 
It is in this context that one should consider Constant’s religious writings, and in 
particular his five-volume treatise De la religion considérée dans sa source, ses formes et 
ses développements (1824-1831). It is worth noting that Constant himself regarded this 
work as his most important undertaking and achievement. In it he addressed the religious 
and political concerns of nineteenth century Frenchmen and wrote constructively about 
the power of  unobstructed “religious sentiment” to save France. Scholars need to take 
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these views on religion seriously if they wish to understand what his personal brand of 
liberalism was really about.  
Recent signs indicate that scholarship is moving in the right direction. 
Overturning the negativity of previous approaches to Constant, Tzvetan Todorov’s short 
but insightful book emphasizes those aspects of Constant’s work that are nourishing 
rather than critical of democracy. Todorov hails Constant as both a “humanist” and “the 
first great thinker of liberal democracy.”63 Interestingly, Todorov’s autobiographical 
reflections reveal a personal history that is in some ways similar to that of other 
prominent admirers of Constant.  A Bulgarian by birth and upbringing, Todorov recounts 
that his own vision of the world “was structured by the experience of totalitarianism” and 
a concomitant loss of faith in Marxism.64 Moreover, like the others, Todorov would not 
define himself as an intellectual historian. His methodology does not involve a 
reconstruction of Constant’s historical context. Rather, Todorov tries to engage in what 
he calls a  “dialogical history of thought,”65 which draws on the “veritable sympathy” and 
“almost personal attachment”66 he feels for Constant.  Todorov hopes that by simply 
reading Constant “attentively,” he will not misinterpret him. 67 Although the result has a 
very personal flavor, Todorov does arrive at a more positive and constructive reading of 
Constant. He accomplishes this by taking a broader interest in Constant as both a person 
and as a theorist. Perhaps most importantly, Todorov is sensitive to what he identifies as 
                                                 
63 T. Todorov, Passion for Democracy, pp. 83 & 5. 
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Paris: Seuil, 2002, p. 347. 
65Ibid., p. 193. 
66Ibid., p. 235.  
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Constant’s “spiritual aspirations.”68 In fact, Todorov has recently collaborated with 
Etienne Hofmann in bringing out a new edition of Constant’s  De la religion, which 
Todorov celebrates in his preface as a “forgotten masterpiece.”69  
Finally, the work of Lucien Jaume is shedding light on Constant’s more positive 
contributions to social, political and constitutional thought. Of all recent French theorists, 
Jaume also comes the closest to adopting a truly historical and contextual approach to 
Constant. In the introduction to his L’Individu effacé ou le paradoxe du libéralisme, 
Jaume acknowledges his debt to the work of François Furet, respectfully paying tribute to 
“the irreplacable master.” This intellectual affinity helps to explain why Jaume’s book 
has an essentially negative point. Jaume wishes to call attention to the illiberalism of 
French liberalism and hence its ultimate failure. In doing so, however, he uses Constant 
as an effective foil. Jaume shows that in contrast to French liberalism, which retained a 
fundamentally statist orientation, Constant’s variety, much like Mme de Staël’s, was 
more individualistic, reflecting its Protestant and Swiss milieu.70 Jaume’s approach and 
interests have thus helped to call attention to the important contributions to liberalism of 
the “Coppet group,” the friends and collaborators of Mme de Staël, who met at her 
father’s chateau near Geneva. He has also shown interest in Constant’s legal and 
constitutional thought, a relatively underexplored but important field.71 Perhaps most 
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significantly, Jaume’s work as a whole suggests that there is much of positive and 
constructive value in Constant’s thought, something that bodes well not only for Constant 
scholarship, but perhaps even for contemporary French political theory. 
It has been noted that, in France, intellectual history as a discipline is still “in the 
process of construction.”72 Recent Constant scholarship certainly bears this assessment 
out. In the main, this field has been the province of political theorists who have treated 
Constant more as an analytical tool for their own polemical purposes than as a historical 
subject in his own right. Moreover, these high-profile admirers of Constant suffer from 
anxieties about modernity and democracy, producing work that tends to be more 
diagnostic and pessimistic than constructive or promotional. This helps to explain why 
Constant, although he has certainly benefited from the French “return to politics,” has 
also suffered from a skewed and partial reading. It can only be hoped that new 
discussions of methodology, already under way in France,73 will lead to broader and 
more nuanced treatments. Then perhaps scholars will have a fresh reason to read 
Constant—they will read him to gain insights into his thought and his world, and not just 
to see a rather sad reflection of their own. 
Present-day theorists need not fear that recovering the historical Constant will 
somehow diminish his relevance. In fact, I believe the opposite to be true. Others before 
me have argued convincingly that restoring a thinker to his own context and rhetorical 
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circumstances will actually enhance rather than diminish his present usefulness.74 It does 
this by enriching the quality of the dialogue we can have with him or her and by 
sensitizing us to the broad range of arguments and choices available to us at any given 
time. More to the point, the careful reconstruction of a world that is in fact quite  foreign 
to us allows us to gain a better perspective on our own. In conclusion, therefore, there is 
indeed much for us to learn from Constant, but we should begin by approaching him in 
the context of his own times. 
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